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energy	costs	and	implications	for	the	study	of	sustainability	
transitions	
Ronan	Bolton,	Science,	Technology	&	Innovation	Studies,	University	of	Edinburgh	
Ronan.bolton@ed.ac.uk	
Abstract	
This	paper	will	seek	to	address	the	following	question:	How	are	whole	system	costs	allocated	
in	the	electricity	transition?	New	technologies	require	existing	infrastructure	to	be	
reconfigured	and	this	imposes	additional	whole	system	costs	which	need	to	be	collectivised	
and	allocated	across	system	users	in	some	way.	The	paper	is	a	discussion	piece	written	with	
a	view	to	investigating	whole	system	cost	allocation	through	empirical	research,	for	
example,	into	how	levels	and	types	of	electricity	capacity	are	decided	upon,	and	how	costs	
are	recovered	and	allocated	through	different	types	of	charging	methodologies	and	tariffs.	
The	costs	of	reconfiguration	are	analysed	and	discussed	at	the	national	and	subnational	
levels	through	the	lens	of	allocation	regimes;	the	rules	governing	how	the	economic	costs	
and	risks	involved	in	electricity	supply	are	spread	amongst	system	users.	Ultimately,	the	aim	
is	to	scrutinise	who	pays	for	energy	transitions.	
1 Introduction	
New	technologies	require	existing	infrastructure	to	be	reconfigured	and	this	imposes	
additional	whole	system	costs	which	need	to	be	collectivised	and	allocated	across	system	
users	in	some	way.	In	the	energy	sector,	deep	decarbonisation	implies	a	move	away	from	
traditional	system	configurations	which	were	build	up	around	highly	centralised	and	largely	
thermal-based	forms	of	generation,	an	implication	of	this	will	likely	be	a	requirement	to	
increase	the	overall	capacity	across	electricity	systems.	This	is	in	order	to	cope	with	
increasing	electrification	of	demands	(including	transport	and	heating)	and	the	greater	
complexity	and	variety	of	power	flows	that	will	result	from	high	levels	of	variable	renewable	
energies	(wind	and	solar)	and	increasing	amounts	of	distributed	energy	resources.	This	
paper	will	seek	to	address	the	following	question:	Who	will	pay	for	this	additional	capacity	
and	through	what	political	processes	are	whole	system	costs	allocated	in	the	electricity	
transition?		
While	economists	set	out	to	design	markets	and	regulatory	frameworks	which	allocate	costs	
to	responsible	parties	through	‘cost	reflective’	charging,	the	research	gap	this	study	
proposes	to	fill	is	the	analysis	of	who	makes	decisions	about	cost	allocation	and	on	what	
basis.	The	paper	is	a	discussion	piece	written	as	an	initial	exploration	of	the	topic	through	a	
transitions	studies	lens.	This	is	with	a	view	to	investigating	whole	system	cost	allocation	
through	empirical	research,	for	example,	into	how	levels	and	types	of	electricity	capacity	are	
decided	upon,	and	how	costs	are	recovered	and	allocated	through	different	types	of	
charging	methodologies	and	tariffs.	Ultimately,	the	aim	is	to	scrutinise	who	pays	for	energy	
transitions.		
Two	types	of	whole	system	costs	are	analysed	in	the	paper:	Network	capacity,	on	both	the	
transmission	and	distribution	grids,	and	the	excess	generation	capacity	which	can	be	
dispatched	for	system	balancing.	As	the	electricity	system	needs	to	be	kept	in	balance	
second-by-second	and	the	scope	for	storing	electrical	energy	is	currently	limited,	the	
amount	of	capacity	required	to	meet	demands	and	maintain	reliability	at	any	one	point	in	
time	is	difficult	to	predict	in	advance	and,	due	to	the	risk	of	systemic	failure,	the	cost	of	
failing	to	do	so	are	difficult	to	calculate.	Also,	demand-side	response	to	short-term	price	
signals	is	limited	in	the	electricity	sector	and	as	a	result	the	operation	of	the	market	as	a	
form	of	cost	allocation	is	severely	curtailed;	system	reliability	is	one	of	a	number	of	market	
failures	which	characterise	electricity	markets	(Stoft,	2002).	As	a	result,	in	both	of	these	
areas	–	networks	and	balancing	–	the	costs	of	capacity	are	spread	across	the	system	
amongst	those	connected	to	the	networks.		
Innovation	studies	and	sustainability	transitions	researchers	have	discussed	the	implications	
of	decentralisation	and	different	forms	of	end-user	participation	for	electricity	system	
configurations,	but	this	has	mainly	been	from	the	entry	point	of	the	smart	grid	debate	(e.g.	
Verbong	et	al.,	2013,	Erlinghagen	and	Markard,	2012).	Here,	it	is	claimed	that	with	the	aid	of	
real-time	pricing	and	smart	metering	the	lack	of	demand-side	response	in	electricity	
markets	can	be	overcome	and	innovative	ways	of	providing	capacity	and	balancing	which	do	
not	rely	on	capital	intensive	and	centralised	solutions	can	be	found	(Fox-Penner,	2010).	
While	this	may	be	possible	in	the	medium	and	long	term	–	although	there	are	sceptical	
views	on	the	promise	of	smart	metering	and	grids	(e.g.	Thomas,	2012)	–	the	reality	of	
electricity	system	reconfiguration	today	is	that	centralised	actors	–	mainly	governments,	
network	regulators	and	system	operators	–	are	the	key	decision	makers	when	it	comes	to	
levels	of	capacity	required	and	how	system	costs	are	allocated	between	different	types	of	
generators	and	customers.	Therefore,	rather	than	focusing	on	processes	of	technological	
innovation	and	the	possibilities	around	smart	grids,	the	paper	instead	focuses	on	the	
economic	aspects	of	whole	system	costs	and	reconfiguration	processes	in	today’s	systems.		
In	the	remainder	of	the	paper	the	costs	of	reconfiguration	are	analysed	and	discussed	
through	the	lens	of	allocation	regimes;	i.e.	the	rules	governing	how	the	economic	costs	and	
risks	involved	in	electricity	supply	are	spread	amongst	system	users.	In	the	next	section	we	
discuss	how	such	regimes	operate	and	have	evolved	in	the	context	of	liberalised	electricity	
markets.	Following	this	we	discuss	possible	empirical	strategies	for	investigating	whole	
system	reconfiguration	based	on	an	analysis	of	allocation	regimes	at	the	national	level,	by	
unpacking	and	comparing	allocation	regimes,	and	at	specific	locations	on	the	grid	where	
demand	for	the	integration	of	low-carbon	technologies	is	high	but	grid	capacity	is	weak,	
thus	opening	up	the	potential	for	disruption	of	established	regimes.	In	the	discussion	
section	of	the	paper	we	reflect	on	the	approach	in	the	context	of	research	in	the	innovation	
and	sustainability	transitions	field.	We	discuss	how	a	whole	systems	view	can	open	up	new	
lines	of	questioning	about	the	dynamics	of	transitions,	particularly	around	the	need	to	
scrutinise	who	benefits	from	and	who	pays	for	energy	transitions.		
2 Allocation	regimes	in	liberalised	electricity	markets	
At	a	very	basic	level,	the	way	electricity	is	paid	for	can	be	subdivided	into	two	types	of	
allocation	regime,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	1	below.	The	first	is	termed	a	marginal	pricing	
regime.	Here,	prices	determined	through	the	interaction	of	supply	and	demand	for	
electricity	determine	how	much	energy	is	generated	at	any	one	point	in	time.	Markets	for	
electricity	have	been	designed	around	marginal	cost	pricing	principles	where	consumers	
choose	the	most	competitive	suppliers,	who	in	turn	procure	electricity	from	providers	in	the	
wholesale	market.	As	prices	closely	approximate	the	marginal	costs	of	production,	the	
idealised	outcome	is	that	the	most	competitive	mix	of	power	plants	required	to	meet	
demand	over	a	specified	timeframe	is	selected	–	usually	each	30	min	–	and	that	these	
marginal	prices	send	long-term	signals	to	investors	about	which	plants	are	competitive	and	
to	invest	in.	This	market	doesn’t	operate	autonomously	of	course,	wholesale	and	retail	
markets	for	electricity	were	effectively	designed	and	put	in	place	as	a	result	of	political	
initiative	and	are	highly	structured,	rules-based	markets.		
On	the	other	side	of	the	diagram	is	the	cost	recovery	regime.	Electricity,	like	other	large	
technological	systems,	such	as	water	and	railways,	is	a	networked	industry.	Network	
externalities	and	scale	effects	mean	that	the	bigger	the	network	gets	and	the	more	users	
connected,	paradoxically,	the	cheaper	it	becomes	to	operate	per	unit	of	output	(Künneke,	
1999).	In	these	cases,	once	the	systems	are	place,	they	are	cheap	to	operate	and	maintain,	
that	is	relative	to	the	costs	of	building	the	network	in	the	first	place.	Fixed	costs	will	
therefore	not	be	fully	remunerated	via	short-term	marginal-cost	pricing,	hence	the	need	for	
an	alternative	form	of	cost	recovery	via	a	centralised	mechanism	which	spreads	them	out	
over	many	years	(average	cost	pricing).		
For	the	case	of	electricity	supply	there	is	an	additional	problem,	the	need	for	excess	capacity	
to	meet	uncertain	demands.	Demand	for	electricity	at	any	one	point	in	time	is	extremely	
difficult	to	predict,	this	is	partly	due	to	the	inability	of	existing	metering	infrastructure	to	
send	real-time	price	signals	to	customers,	but	also	the	fact	that	electricity	has	so	many	uses	
and	is	driven	by	a	wide	range	of	economic	and	societal	factors.	This	demand-side	
uncertainty	is	problematic	for	system	planners	across	all	networked	industry	but	is	
accentuated	for	electricity	because	of	the	need	for	second-by-second	system	balancing	and	
the	risk	of	cascading	failures.	In	order	to	cope	with	fluctuations	and	deal	with	this	
uncertainty,	excess	capacity	needs	to	be	built	into	the	system,	in	the	form	of	additional	
power	plants	and	power	lines.	This	additional	layer	of	security	involves	significant	capital	
intensive	investment;	it	is	a	public	good	which	benefits	all	users	of	the	system,	therefore	the	
costs	cannot	be	allocated	to	individual	users	using	short-term	price	signals.	
	
Figure	1:	Idealised	demarcation	of	allocation	regimes	in	a	liberalised	electricity	market	
This	description	of	the	liberalised	electricity	model	is	a	highly	stylised	and	simplified	
account.	It	is	by	no	means	settled	how	an	electricity	market	should	work	in	practice;	for	
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example,	there	has	been	an	ongoing	dispute	within	the	energy	economics	community	about	
whether	investment	in	generation	capacity	can	happen	on	the	basis	of	wholesale	price	
signals	(Keppler,	2017),	and	the	appropriate	level	of	integration	across	the	different	
functional	components	of	an	electricity	system,	in	particular	whether	generation,	
transmission	and	system	balancing	should	be	unbundled	and	treated	as	separate	markets,	
or	whether	a	high	level	of	integration	across	them	is	closer	to	the	optimal	(Wilson,	2002,	
Cramton,	2017).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	implementation	of	electricity	liberalisation	
has	been	a	highly	contentious	and	politicised	issue	in	many	countries	and	by	no	means	a	
universally	accepted	model	(Thomas,	2006).		
A	key	development,	and	one	strongly	related	to	low-carbon	transition,	has	been	a	general	
shift	in	emphasis	in	electricity	markets	away	from	marginal	pricing	towards	cost	recovery	
mechanisms	as	a	means	of	valuing	generation	capacity.	This	has	been	mainly	driven	by	the	
introduction	of	feed-in	tariffs	for	renewables	which,	depending	on	their	design,	involve	a	
transfer	of	risks	related	to	operating	in	the	market	from	investors	to	consumers.	Another	
development	has	been	the	introduction	of	capacity	remuneration	mechanisms	in	many	
national	markets	as	a	means	of	delivering	a	safe	capacity	margin	on	the	system	which,	some	
claim,	is	undeliverable	in	the	‘energy-only’	market	due	to	high	levels	of	price	volatility.		
This	general	shift	towards	more	centralised	forms	of	cost	allocation	in	electricity	systems	
has	become	a	key	topic	in	the	energy	economics	literature	(Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.,	2016,	IEA,	
2016).	Roques	and	Finon,	for	example,	characterise	the	new	dynamic	as	a	hybrid	market	
regime	and	provide	a	very	useful	structural	overview	of	changes	to	key	European	power	
markets	(Roques	and	Finon,	2017).	Some	have	argued	that	the	move	to	a	cost	recovery	
model	for	generation	is	an	irreversible	trend,	the	logic	being	that	as	fossil	fuels	–	whose	
costs	have	traditionally	been	the	key	factor	in	price	formation	at	the	margin	–	are	driven	out	
of	the	system	the	key	source	of	value	in	the	market	will	be	capacity	rather	than	energy	
(Helm,	2017).	Over	time	this	segment	of	the	market	may	begin	to	resemble	the	regulated	
natural	monopoly	areas	where	costs	are	spread	out	over	many	decades	and	allocated	
centrally.	Economists	in	subfields	such	as	institutional	and	industrial	economics,	auction	
theory	and	regulatory	economics	are	broadly	concerned	with	how	to	elicit	information	
about	the	underlying	costs	in	these	areas	of	the	system	where	conventional	market	
approaches	do	not	operate,	and	with	how	these	costs	are	allocated	amongst	different	users	
in	a	way	which	minimises	them.	What	has	been	less	discussed	in	this	literature,	and	a	fertile	
area	for	transitions	researchers,	have	been	the	contextual	factors	which	influence	how	
allocation	regimes	are	designed	and	who	pays.	As	is	discussed	later	in	the	paper,	this	is	by	
no	means	uniform	across	countries.	
3 Key	components	of	whole	system	costs	
Before	turning	to	how	transitions	studies	researchers	might	engage	with	such	questions,	in	
this	section	we	discuss	in	more	detail	the	network	and	balancing	areas	of	the	system,	
focusing	on	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	costs	are	allocated.	First	we	discuss	network	
capacity	costs,	followed	by	balancing.		
3.1 Network	charging	
Capacity	on	the	transmission	and	distribution	networks	is	limited	and	hence	a	scarce	
resource.	As	discussed	above,	charging	for	network	services	is	challenging	because	of	
demand-side	information	asymmetries	and	the	fact	that	a	reliable	network	has	public	good	
characteristics.	Decisions	do	need	to	be	made	however	about	who	pays	for	the	cost	of	
providing	network	capacity.	Broadly,	charges	for	network	services	are	determined	by	
answering	the	following	questions	(further	elaborated	in	the	table	below):	What	the	
charges	are	for?	Who	pays?	Do	charges	vary	depending	on	when	generation	or	consumption	
occurs	and	where	network	users	are	located.	
What?	 • Are	charges	based	on	the	use	of	energy	(kWh),	or	a	capacity	
(KW)	measure	based	on	power	consumption	during	peak	
periods,	or	some	combination	of	the	two?	
Who?	 • How	are	costs	spread	across	generators	and	consumers?	
• How	are	different	types	of	consumer	treated?	(industrial,	
domestic	etc.)	
• Are	there	exemptions	for	some	network	users?	
When?	 • Do	charges	differ	to	reflect	fluctuating	supply	and	demand	
conditions?		
Where?	 • Are	costs	spread	evenly	across	the	system	or	are	localized	
capacity	constraints	considered?	
Table	1:	Design	parameters	for	network	tariffs.	Based	on	(Grubb	and	Drummond,	2018)	
3.2 Balancing	the	system	
A	second	area	of	whole	system	costs	relevant	to	the	discussion	is	related	to	balancing	the	
electricity	system.	As	discussed	previously,	due	to	uncertainty	and	technical	constraints,	it	
has	never	been	clear	to	system	operators	what	demand	levels	might	be	during	a	scarcity	
period.	The	value	of	lost	load	for	most	customers	–	the	price	at	which	they	might	be	willing	
to	agree	to	be	disconnected	–	cannot	be	found	through	markets	as	system	operators	(SOs)	
are	risk	averse	and	will	intervene	quickly	if	there	is	an	imbalance.	Dealing	with	this	
uncertainty	requires	some	form	of	central	intervention	to	dispatch	capacity	to	balance	the	
system	and,	because	this	is	done	at	some	remove	from	market	trading,	the	costs	have	to	be	
recovered	retrospectively	(Bolton	et	al.,	2016).	
On	the	exchange-based	power	markets	which	have	been	implemented	in	many	European	
countries	costs	arise	through	the	process	of	balancing	the	system,	a	brief	explanation	is	as	
follows:	After	a	point	known	as	‘gate	closure’	the	operation	of	the	free	market	is	
progressively	curtailed	until,	very	close	to	real-time	delivery,	market	trading	concludes	and	
instructions	are	sent	to	capacity	providers	to	provide	different	types	of	services	required	to	
maintain	the	stability	of	the	system.	In	the	British	market	there	are	two	forms	of	cost	during	
this	period1.		
1. The	first	is	during	a	trading	period	known	as	the	balancing	mechanism;	essentially	a	
centrally	coordinated	energy	balancing	market.	Here	buyers	and	sellers	submit	bids	
and	offers	into	the	market	to	adjust	their	positions	and	ensure	they	are	in	balance.	
National	Grid,	the	SO,	also	participates	in	this	market	and,	based	on	the	costs	of	
doing	this,	it	calculates	imbalance	prices	which	are	imposed	on	those	generators	and	
																																																						
1	See	slide	5:	https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/41372/electricity-cash-out-pdf	(accessed	9.5.18)	
suppliers	who	deviated	from	the	positions	that	were	communicated	to	the	SO	at	
gate	closure.		
2. The	second	cost	is	related	to	the	‘out-of-market’	short-term	measures	by	the	SO	
which	are	deemed	necessary	to	balance	the	system	in	real-time.	In	Britain	there	has	
been	four	main	categories	of	products	which	are	procured	by	the	SO:	Response	and	
reserves	to	deal	with	frequency	and	system	balancing	issues	from	seconds	to	20+	
minutes,	voltage	control,	primarily	local	network	issues,	and	other	ancillary	services	
required	for	system	security.	Under	these	main	categories	there	will	be	a	number	of	
specific	contracts	for	which	the	SO	puts	out	tenders2.	
In	some	countries,	like	Britain,	these	balancing	costs	are	essentially	socialised.	Recovery	of	
both	of	these	costs	is	through	Balancing	Services	Use	of	System	(BSUoS)	charges	which	“is	
recovered	from	both	generation	and	demand	in	equal	proportion,	by	the	Balancing	Services	
Use	of	System	(BSUoS)	Tariff,	calculated	daily	as	a	flat	tariff	(per	MWh)	across	all	users”	
(Grubb	and	Drummond,	2018).	In	other	markets,	such	as	Germany,	balancing	costs	are	not	
allocated	separately	but	as	part	of	the	transmission	network	charge.	This	means	there	will	
be	geographic	variation	in	balancing	costs	depending	on	which	of	the	four	German	
transmission	grids	a	customer	is	connected	to.	
4 The	politics	of	whole	system	costs		
It	is	generally	recognised	that	there	is	no	concrete	law	or	set	of	laws	in	economics	for	how	
to	recover	these	whole	system	costs	(Pollitt,	2018,	Grubb	and	Drummond,	2018).	A	general	
principle	applied	by	energy	economists	is	cost	reflectivity;	essentially	to	calculate	and	
recover	costs	based	on	how	they	are	imposed	on	the	system	at	particular	times	and	
particular	locations	by	different	network	users.	However,	as	Pollitt	notes,	economics	only	
provides	general	principles	which,	although	delivering	efficient	outcomes	in	the	context	of	
an	overall	system,	will	have	disproportionate	effects	on	some	consumers,	for	example	those	
who	may	be	inflexible	and	unresponsive	to	price	signals	(Pollitt,	2018)	3.	How	this	tension	
between	economic	efficiency	at	the	whole	system	level	and	the	political	implications	of	
different	allocation	regimes	in	terms	of	distributional	effects	is	negotiated	is	a	key	site	of	
contestation	in	the	design	of	cost	recovery	mechanisms.	
4.1 Varieties	of	allocation	regimes	
Unsurprisingly,	given	the	lack	of	strict	guidance	from	economic	theory	regarding	the	
recovery	of	fixed	costs,	there	is	significant	variation	across	countries.	This	is	illustrated	well	
in	the	figure	below	from	Hinz	et	al.’s	study	of	network	charges	(Hinz	et	al.,	2018).	Here,	each	
European	country	is	positioned	according	to	a	number	of	categories,	including	the	
percentage	of	costs	levied	on	generators	as	opposed	to	end	users,	the	balance	between	
energy/volumetric	and	capacity	charges,	whether	transmission	and	distribution	charges	
reflect	the	costs	of	operation	specific	regional	grids	or	are	evened	out	across	the	user	base,	
and	whether	charges	for	initial	grid	connection	are	upfront	and	reflect	the	cost	of	adding	
new	capacity	(deep)	or	are	spread	out	over	time	and	levied	as	a	usage	charge	(kWh).				
																																																						
2	https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/balancing-services/future-balancing-services	(accessed	9.5.18)	
3	As	marginal	prices	calculated	based	on	time	and/or	location	of	consumption	will	not	be	sufficient	to	recover	
fixed	costs	some	economists	propose	to	allocate	these	costs	based	on	the	differences	in	price	elasticity	of	
demand	of	consumers	(Ramsey-Boiteux	pricing).	Essentially,	inelastic	customers	pay	a	higher	proportion	as	
they	are	less	likely	to	change	their	consumption	patterns	on	the	basis	of	higher	prices,	therefore	cost	recovery	
has	less	of	an	impact	on	consumption	and	hence	overall	efficiency.	
	
Figure:		Approach	to	transmission	charging	in	different	European	countries	(Hinz	et	al.,	2018)	
Of	course,	energy	economists	are	best	equipped	to	make	recommendations	to	regulators	
and	policy	makers	about	the	likely	material	impacts	of	different	cost	recovery	mechanisms,	
that	is	within	the	confines	of	analytical	frameworks	and	categories	developed	by	economists	
themselves,	such	as	economic	efficiency	and	societal	welfare.	The	contribution	of	socio-
technical	systems	research	should	be	to	pose	more	critical	questions	about	choices	and	
underlying	political	drivers;	to	account	for	why	these	national-level	differences	exist.	
One	potential	avenue	to	explain	variation	at	the	national-level	is	to	examine	the	political	
processes	involved	in	designing	and	implementing	specific	policies	and	regulatory	
instruments.	Recent	work	on	the	politics	of	sustainability	transitions	has	highlighted	the	
need	to	examine	policy	processes	in	much	more	empirical	depth	and	to	engage	with	a	wider	
range	of	analytical	lenses	in	the	policy	studies	literature,	including,	amongst	others,	the	
advocacy	coalitions	framework	and	the	multiple	streams	approach	(Kern	and	Rogge,	2017).	
However,	an	important	difference	between	the	design	of	cost	recovery	regimes	and	the	
types	of	policy	processes	typically	analysed	in	transitions	research	–	niche	protection	
policies	to	support	demonstration	and	early	stage	deployment	–	is	that	decision	making	
processes	in	relation	to	allocation	regimes	tend	not	to	be	overtly	political	and,	despite	their	
economic	importance,	often	do	not	attract	the	same	level	of	stakeholder	attention	as,	for	
example,	siting	controversies	for	wind	farms	or	decisions	to	reduce	feed-in-tariff	rates.	
Processes	will	tend	to	be	more	characterised	by	very	specific	and	highly	technical	debates	
around	the	design	of	regulatory	instruments	and	market	devices.		
In	order	to	understand	the	distinctive	character	of	these	processes	insights	can	be	drawn	
from	the	literature	on	the	history	of	technology	in	which	experts	and	technocratic	processes	
are	central	to	the	explanation	of	how	large	technological	systems	emerged	and	evolved	in	
the	19th	and	20th	centuries	(Hughes,	1983,	Kaiser	and	Schot,	2014,	Lagendijk,	2008).	
Technocratic	processes,	as	charted	by	historians	of	European	infrastructure	(Högselius	et	al.,	
2015),	were	purposely	designed	by	powerful	system	builders	to	remove	politics	from	
decision	making	processes	and	to	deliberately	‘technify’	contentious	issues.	Disagreements	
were	thus	solved	whilst	keeping	them	within	the	confines	of	a	shared	technical	language	
and	culture.	Engaging	in	and	influencing	such	processes	therefore	typically	involves	high	
entry	barriers,	both	in	terms	of	expertise	and	institutional	access;	understanding	and	
opening	them	up	to	critical	investigation	should	be	a	contribution	of	socio-technical	
research	into	allocation	regimes.	
While	the	detailed	analysis	of	how	specific	policies	and	regulatory	instruments	have	been	
designed	and	introduced	should	be	investigated	as	a	source	of	variation,	this	does	not	
account	for	the	underlying	structural	processes	which	influence	the	design	of	allocation	
regimes	and,	ultimately,	who	pays.	Investigating	how,	for	example,	different	types	of	
industry	actors	and	groupings	lobby	government	for	favourable	tariffs	and	exemptions	
would	be	an	interesting	extension	of	Hall	and	Soskice’s	varieties	of	capitalism	(VoC)	thesis	
(Hall	and	Soskice,	2001);	that	variations	in	national	economic	performance	can	be	explained	
by	complementarities	between	the	interests	of	powerful	public	and	private	actors.	
Economic	institutions	across	key	spheres	of	economic	activity	–	labour	relations	and	
corporate	governance,	inter-firm	collaboration	and	competition,	training	and	education	–	
are	shaped	by	these	complementarities	and	differ	markedly	between	liberal	market	
economies	(LMEs)	-	US,	Australia	and	UK	-	and	coordinated	market	economies	(CMEs)	-	
Germany	and	France.	Economic	outcomes	in	LMEs	tend	to	be	as	a	result	of	competitive	
processes,	with	government	involvement	taking	the	form	of	competition	policy	and	
independent	economic	regulation,	whereas	in	CMEs	outcomes	are	achieved	more	through	
negotiation	and	collaborative	governance,	with	government	as	a	more	active	participant	
and	partner	of	corporate	actors	and	labour	unions.		
A	brief	analysis	of	how	large	industrial	consumers	are	charged	for	network	services	indicates	
that	the	theory	may	have	some	relevance	to	the	analysis	of	why	national	regimes	differ.	The	
box	below	summarises	the	level	to	which	different	categories	of	industrial	customers,	
categorised	into	bands	1A-1F4,	are	charged	for	transmission	networks	in	a	number	of	
European	countries.	Here	we	see	different	mixes	based	on	charges	for	electricity	use	and	
capacity,	and	some	also	accounting	for	location	on	the	transmission	grid,	as	in	the	British	
case.	In	Germany	the	network	and	balancing	costs	are	bundled	together	into	a	single	
charge,	whereas	in	Britain	they	are	separated,	with	balancing	costs	spread	evenly	across	all	
users.	There	is	a	more	even	spread	across	customer	bands	in	Britain,	as	oppose	to	Germany,	
and	they	are	significantly	lower	for	very	high-usage	customers	in	Italy	and	France.	It	may	be	
the	case	that	the	relatively	even	spread	of	transmission	costs	across	the	different	bands	of	
industrial	consumer	in	Britain	can	be	explained	by	its	historic	commitment	to	competitive	
markets,	often	at	the	expense	of	industrial	policy;	whereas	in	the	CMEs	large,	electricity	
intensive	industries	may	hold	a	stronger	bargaining	position.	In-depth	qualitative	analysis	of	
the	institutional	history	of	the	allocation	regimes	of	these	countries	would	be	required	to	
investigate	the	VoC	thesis	and	whether	the	governance	of	natural	monopolies	can	be	added	
to	Hall	and	Soskice’s	list	of	economic	spheres	which	differentiate	LMEs	and	CMEs.	
																																																						
4	In	the	Eurostat	database	industrial	customers	are	categorised	into	several	consumption	bands	based	on	
annual	consumption	(MWh):	1A<20;	20<1B<500;	500<1C<2,000;	2,000<1D<20,000;	20,000<1E<70,000;	
70,000<1F<150,000	(Grubb	&	Drummond,	2018,	table	1	p.14)	
Overview	of	transmission	costs	faced	by	industrial	customers	in	European	countries.	Based	on	(Grubb	and	
Drummond,	2018)	
Britain	
• Costs	recovered	through	Transmission	Network	Use	of	System	charges	(TNUoS)	
• For	larger	customers	with	half	hourly	metering	this	is	based	on	usage	during	the	three	periods	of	
highest	demand	(known	as	‘Triads’)	
• Charges	also	depend	on	location	with	the	application	of	a	‘location-specific	tariff’;	‘from	£29.58/	kW	
in	Northern	Scotland,	to	£51.96/kW	in	South-	West	England	in	2017/18’	
Germany	
• Network	and	balancing	costs	are	combined	into	a	single	tariff	applied	across	the	4	networks	which	
are	regulated	separately	
• Charged	on	the	basis	of	both	fixed	cost	of	capacity	of	connection	and	variable	level	of	consumption	
• Fixed	charges	increase	as	a	proportion	of	total	cost	for	high	consuming	customers	(>2,500hrs	of	
consumption)	
• Bespoke	tariff	rates	and	discounts	can	be	made	available	to	customers	with	very	high	usage,	over	
10GWh.	Max	discounts	can	range	from	80-90%,	depending	on	level	of	usage.	
France	
• A	single	tariff	for	both	transmission	and	balancing	and	no	differentiation	based	on	location.		
• Tariff	‘based	principally	on	the	consumer’s	voltage	and	capacity	of	connection,	and	time	of	
consumption’	
• This	includes	a	fixed	and	variable	charge	and	is	calculated	for	customers	at	different	voltage	levels	
during	‘pre-defined	time	periods’.	Most	customers	can	select	from	‘one	of	three	tariff	options,	with	
different	weighting	to	the	fixed	and	variable	components’	whereas	customers	connected	at	higher	
voltage	levels	(350-500Kv)	‘pay	a	fixed	capacity	charge	and	a	single	consumption	rate,	without	time	
differentiation’		
• Certain	categories	of	industrial	customers	also	qualify	for	‘tariff	reductions	based	on	their	total	
consumption,	pro	le	of	use	and	electro-intensity’	
Italy	
• Separate	tariffs	for	‘transmission	and	distribution,	metering,	and	system	services,	all	of	which	are	
applied	equally	across	the	country’	
• Only	customers	connected	at	>380kV	pay	a	fixed	rate	capacity	charge	and	a	variable	usage	charge	is	
applied	across	all	customers	but	disproportionately	to	lower	voltage.	High	voltage	customer	pay	
approx.	90%	less	than	those	at	medium	voltage.	
	
Figure	2:	Comparison	of	transmission	costs	faced	by	industrial	customers.	Source:	(Grubb	and	Drummond,	
2018)	
4.2 Disruption	of	national	allocation	regimes	in	transitions	
National	allocation	regimes	are	struggling	to	cope	with	the	integration	of	low-carbon	
technologies.	As	a	result,	new	arenas	of	contestation	are	opening	up	where,	in	the	absence	
of	established	procedures	for	the	the	integration	of	non-conventional	technologies	in	parts	
of	the	system	where	capacity	is	weak,	stakeholders	negotiate	whole	system	cost	allocation	
in	a	more	overtly	political	way.	
National	regimes	have	been	designed	with	centralised	generation	technologies	in	mind.	
Taking	into	account	the	potential	for	unscheduled	maintenance	of	nuclear	and	thermal	pant	
and	seasonal	variations	which	affect	hydro	plants,	the	power	output	of	these	conventional	
sources	of	electricity	generation	have	been	relatively	predictable,	while	their	geographic	
distribution	across	the	transmission	grid	could	be	planned,	or	at	least	predicted.	As	a	result,	
the	additional	capacity	required	for	system	integration	could	be	calculated	with	some	
certainty,	enabling	system	planning.		
However,	for	a	number	of	reasons,	the	same	level	of	certainty	does	not	apply	to	low-carbon	
technologies,	in	particular	variable	renewables.	Wind	resource	is	often	most	abundant	in	
geographical	locations	where	the	transmission	grid	is	either	not	present	or	weak,	while	solar	
PV	systems	are	being	deployed	on	the	lower	voltage	distribution	grids	or	behind-the-meter	
at	the	building	level.	This,	alongside	the	increasing	electrification	of	transport	and	heating	
demand,	is	putting	pressure	on	lower	voltage	grids	where	systems	and	cost	allocation	
regimes	have	been	designed	for	one-way	flow	of	electrons.		
As	these	issues	are	related	to	quite	specific	locations	on	the	grid	where	capacity	constraints	
are	imposing	high	costs,	it	is	typically	at	the	local	or	regional	levels	where	regimes	are	being	
challenged.	Below	we	provide	two	very	brief	case	studies	to	illustrate:	
4.2.1 Transmission	charges	and	wind	energy	in	Scotland	
The	long	running	dispute	in	Scotland	relates	to	the	locational	element	of	the	transmission	
usage	(TNUoS)	charges	explained	earlier	in	the	paper.	Due	to	the	low	population	in	
Northern	Scotland	transmission	capacity	is	comparatively	low,	however,	the	region	has	the	
best	wind	resource	in	Europe	and	as	a	result	there	has	been	a	long	running	dispute	between	
Scottish	stakeholders	and	the	UK	government	about	how	the	costs	of	the	additional	
transmission	capacity	required	might	negatively	impact	the	economics	of	wind	in	Scotland.	
This	position	is	summarised	in	a	2011	statement	by	the	Scottish	Government:	
“The	grid	network	in	Scotland	needs	to	be	able	to	deliver	the	connections	that	will	
transport	and	export	the	remarkable	renewable	energy	potential	in	Scotland	and	its	
islands	-	with	an	estimated	quarter	of	EU	tidal	and	wind	power	and	10%	of	its	wave	
power”5	
The	core	of	the	dispute	was	about	equity	and	fairness,	particularly	in	relation	to	how	
transmission	costs	are	spread	across	the	network	user	base.	The	main	argument	mobilised	
by	the	Scottish	Government	at	the	time	was	that	the	locational	element	in	the	transmission	
charge	was	unfair	to	Scottish	generators	which,	they	pointed	out,	“produce	about	12%	of	
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9.5.18)	
	
UK	generation	but	account	for	40%	of	the	transmission	costs,	or	about	£100	million	per	year	
more	than	generators	in	the	South”	(ibid).	
Scottish	stakeholders	called	for	a	“national	network	charge”	which	would	socialise	costs	
across	the	UK.	This	became	part	of	a	number	of	issues	under	consideration	as	part	of	a	UK	
House	of	Commons	Energy	and	Climate	Change	Select	Committee	investigation	into	
network	costs,	following	which	the	UK	Government	summarised	its	position	on	the	proposal	
in	2016:		
“Electricity	network	charges	vary	by	region	and	reflect	the	costs	of	running	the	network	in	
that	area	and	the	number	of	consumers	that	those	costs	are	spread	over.	The	
Government	does	not	plan	to	move	to	national	network	charging,	as	the	current	cost	
reflective	approach	helps	to	ensure	efficient	use	of	the	network	and	keeps	overall	costs	
down	for	bill	payers	across	Great	Britain.	In	contrast,	national	pricing	risks	an	overall	
increase	in	network	costs	by	weakening	each	network	company’s	local	accountability	to	
its	customers,	as	well	as	making	charges	less	transparent”6	
The	analysis	behind	the	UK	Government’s	position	was	conducted	by	the	energy	regulator,	
OFGEM,	and	published	in	2015	(OFGEM,	2015).	OFGEM	examined	charging	across	both	
electricity	and	gas,	and	at	the	transmission	and	distribution	levels;	according	to	their	
analysis,	the	current	transmission	charging	approach	actually	favours	consumers	in	this	
particular	Scottish	region:		
“‘typical’	households	on	the	single	rate	the	electricity	transmission	component	of	their	
bills	range	from	£21	per	year	in	North	Scotland	to	£37	in	London	and	Southern	England”	
(ibid)	
A	stronger	regional	disparity	emerged	when	electricity	distribution	charges	were	analysed,	
with	households	in	the	North	of	Scotland	consuming	more	electricity,	in	part	because	many	
are	not	connected	to	the	gas	grid	and	hence	having	higher	electricity	usage	for	heating.	For	
an	average	customer	the	combined	annual	transmission	charges	differ	significantly	in	
London	and	the	North	of	Scotland:	“from	£107	(London)	to	£169	(North	Scotland)”.	They	
also	found	that	in	the	North	of	Scotland	“electricity	distribution	charges	are	£47	above	the	
Great	Britain	average	but	electricity	transmission	charges	there	are	£11	lower	than	average”	
(p23).	
OFGEM	analysed	the	effects	of	moving	to	a	national	network	charge,	i.e.	socialization	of	
costs	across	the	customer	base,	and	stated	the	following:	
“approximately	16	million	households	would	face	higher	bills,	while	around	11	million	
would	see	reduced	bills	under	such	an	approach.	In	most	cases	the	increase	or	decrease	
would	be	small.	In	Scotland,	1.8	million	households	would	face	higher	bills	and	0.7	million	
households	would	see	reductions…There	does	not	appear	to	be	any	clear	justification	for	
national	network	charges	in	terms	of	regional	concentration	of	vulnerability”	
This	is	an	ongoing	dispute	with	many	dimensions	and	complexities	but,	as	this	brief	excerpt	
illustrates,	the	polices	are	shaped	by	stakeholder	interests	and	positions,	but	also	by	forms	
of	technical	appraisal	which,	in	this	case,	were	based	on	quite	different	framings	of	fairness	
and	equity.	For	the	Scottish	Government	the	key	priority	was	the	impact	on	generation	
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investment	in	the	region	and	competitiveness	in	the	GB	power	market,	whereas	for	OFGEM	
the	focus	of	the	analysis	was	on	costs	to	end	consumers,	this	is	unsurprising	given	that	their	
legal	duty	as	a	regulator	is	to	“protect	the	interests	of	current	and	future	consumers”.		
4.2.2 PV	behind-the-meter:	production	or	consumption?	
While	the	controversy	about	network	charging	in	Scotland	is	primarily	focused	on	the	
transmission	level,	the	issue	of	the	balance	between	generators	and	consumers	and	
locational	charging	cuts	across	the	networks.	An	issue	which	has	become	particularly	
controversial	is	the	treatment	of	prosumers	who	invest	in	behind-the-meter	(BTM)	
installations	where	generation	and	end-use	become	conflated.	Here	there	are	different	
views	on	whether	self-generation	should	be	categorised	as	production	or	consumption	and	
how	the	excess	electricity	not	consumed	by	the	prosumer	is	valued	in	the	market;	should	it	
be	sold	into	the	grid	at	wholesale	prices	(which	would	likely	be	very	low),	or	netted	off	
against	future	consumption,	in	effect	valuing	the	electricity	at	the	higher	retail	rate?	If	it	is	
the	latter	this	excess	is	categorized	as	a	saving	for	the	grid	rather	than	an	input,	which	leads	
to	a	potential	misallocation	of	resources;	PV	may	be	producing	excess	during	low	demand	
periods	meaning	that	highly	valuable	electricity	at	peak	times	is	priced	at	too	low	a	rate.	
Also,	retail	rates	typically	include	whole	system	and	policy	costs,	therefore	providing	what	is	
in	effect	a	subsidy	which	is	paid	for	by	the	non-prosuming	customers7.	
In	Spain,	for	example,	this	issue	came	to	the	fore	when	in	20158	the	Government	introduced	
a	new	law	which	prohibited	electricity	export	from	consumers	whose	peak	consumption	is	
less	than	100kW.	The	change	in	legislation	also	meant	that	consumption	related	charges	-	
for	network,	policy	and	other	system	costs	-	would	take	into	account	a	combination	of	
output	and	input	based	on	metering	at	the	interface	with	the	main	grid,	but	the	key	point	of	
controversy	was	that	the	metered	self-generation	-	which	is	mostly	consumed	by	the	owner	
-	would	also	be	subject	to	these	charges,	and	as	such	be	primarily	categorized	as	
consumption	rather	than	production	(Aragonés	et	al.,	2016).	This	led	to	a	framing	of	the	
new	tariff	as	a	“sun	tax”9	.	Its	introduction	is	still	disputed	and	the	issue	remains	unresolved.	
In	relation	to	BTM	generation	it	is	worth	also	specifying	the	problems	in	relation	to	network	
charging.	Although	much	of	the	consumption	on	an	average	basis	will	be	met	by	the	solar	
installation,	there	will	be	times	when	grid	generation	will	be	needed,	and	as	a	result	a	grid	
connection	required.	At	the	moment,	for	domestic	customers,	much	of	the	distribution	
network	tariffs	in	Europe	are	based	on	volume	rather	than	capacity	related	charges	(as	
described	above),	therefore	the	cost	of	providing	this	energy	security	benefit	is	only	partially	
covered.	The	network	capacity	issue	is	relevant	because	a	prosumer	is	still	likely	to	need	the	
same	level	of	grid	capacity	which	will	be	the	maximum	demand	required	during	peak	
consumption	hours.	This	issue	is	complex	because	up	to	a	certain	level	of	penetration	BTM	
generation	is	actually	beneficial	to	the	grid	as	it	reduces	the	need	for	centralised	provision	
of	voltage	and	frequency	control.			
																																																						
7	The	trade-off	between	Prosumer	and	societal	benefits	is	summarised	succinctly	as	follows:	“Absent	specific	
regulation,	from	the	consumer	viewpoint,	the	economic	value	of	self-generation	is	the	energy	saving	(€/kWh)	
that	includes,	in	addition	to	energy	costs,	the	policy	charges	and	some	network	costs.	However,	from	the	
societal	viewpoint,	the	value	of	self-generation	is	rather	the	system	avoided	cost,	that	is,	energy	and	network	
variable	costs,	but	not	the	other	system	costs	and	policy	charges”	(Aragonés	et	al.,	2016)	
8	Royal	Decree	(RD)	900/2015	
9	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24272061	(accessed	9.5.18)	
This	policy	challenge	of	valuing	BTM	is	well	known	and	has	been	studied	in	significant	depth	
from	a	techno-economic	perspective	(Green	and	Staffell,	Pérez-Arriaga	et	al.,	2016).	What	
has	been	less	studied	is	how	such	technical	disputes	are	related	to	wider	political	contexts.	
A	socio-technical	analysis	of	the	Spanish	case	could	explore	links	to	the	2008/9	financial	
crisis	when	the	Government	introduced	significant	cuts	to	renewable	support	policies.	In	
Scotland	the	dispute	is	strongly	related	to	the	UK’s	devolution	settlement	in	the	area	of	
energy	and	environmental	policy.	The	Scottish	Government	has	powers	to	set	its	own	
emissions	reductions	targets	and,	unlike	the	UK	Government,	has	set	specific	targets	for	
meeting	demand	in	Scotland	from	renewable	sources.	However,	powers,	and	hence	
responsibility,	over	electricity	prices,	markets,	network	regulation	and	levels	of	renewable	
subsidies	are	with	the	UK	Government.	The	dispute	about	transmission	charging	is	in	some	
ways	a	proxy	for	this	wider	institutional	alignment	and	the	political	tensions	between	these	
different	governance	levels.	
5 Conclusions	
The	contribution	of	this	paper	has	been	to	draw	attention	to	the	understudied	issue	of	
whole	system	costs	which,	because	of	the	collective	nature	of	electricity	systems,	technical	
constraints,	and	market	imperfections,	are	difficult	to	assign	to	individual	system	users	and	
are	typically	recovered	centrally	through	regulated	network	tariffs.	As	low-carbon	
technologies	move	from	protected	niches	to	the	mainstream	and	are	integrated	into	
systems,	the	issue	of	how	the	associated	costs	will	be	allocated	will	become	increasingly	
salient.	It	has	been	argued	here	that	socio-technical	systems	research	should	focus	on	how	
and	why	allocation	regimes	–	the	rules	governing	how	the	economic	costs	and	risks	involved	
in	electricity	supply	are	spread	amongst	system	users	–	differ	at	the	national	level.	It	was	
also	discussed	how	these	regimes	are	being	disrupted	and	potentially	dismantled	as	new	
arenas	of	politicisation	are	opening	up	at	specific	parts	of	the	grid	where	capacity	is	limited.	
This	leads	certain	actors	to	question	the	underpinning	principles	of	national	regimes	which	
have	been	built	around	conventional	technologies	and	system	configurations.		
It	will	of	course	be	beneficial	for	certain	consumers	and	advocates	of	different	technologies	
–	both	high	and	low	carbon	–	to	lobby	for	reduced	tariffs	or	exemptions	from	system	costs.	
A	challenge	for	transitions	researchers	investigating	such	a	highly	politicised	issue	will	be	
how	to	position	the	research.	One	option	would	be	to	appraise	claims	and	counter	claims	
about	system	costs	whilst	remaining	neutral	about	societal	impacts,	similar	to	the	
symmetrical	approach	developed	in	the	sociology	of	scientific	knowledge	(Bloor,	1976);	
another	would	be	to	develop	some	form	of	normative	stance	which,	for	example,	favours	
certain	types	of	low-carbon	technologies,	consumer	groups,	or	which	adopts	the	principles	
of	social	welfare	as	developed	in	the	economics	discipline.	Another	research	challenge	
identified	is	the	highly	complex	and	technical	nature	of	the	debate	around	specific	market	
and	regulatory	instruments	which	creates	barriers	to	wider	stakeholder	participation.	This	
may	mean	that	these	processes	may	not	be	amenable	to	conventional	frameworks	in	
political	science	and	policy	studies	which	have	been	discussed	elsewhere	as	suitable	for	the	
analysis	of	energy	transitions.		
Finally,	the	organisers	of	this	conference	have	rightly	pointed	out	that	an	important,	but	
now	largely	neglected,	intellectual	foundation	of	transitions	studies	was	the	study	of	
complex	systems	as	configurations	of	material	and	social	elements	which	are	deeply	
embedded	in	societies	(Green	et	al.,	1999,	Rip	and	Kemp,	1998).	This	(re)turn	to	whole	
systems	analysis	is	an	important	contribution	to	a	field	which	has	increasingly	aligned	itself	
with	the	study	of	technological	innovation	processes	and	policy	design	in	that	single	
domain.	It	has	been	shown	here	that	who	should	pay	for	energy	transitions	is	a	surprisingly	
difficult	question	to	answer,	but	a	potentially	fruitful	one	for	the	transitions	studies	field	as	
it	engages	in	a	more	substantive	way	with	wider	processes	of	system	change.		
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